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CONJECTURES ON THREE-DIMENSIONAL STABLE
MATCHING
KIMMO ERIKSSON, JONAS SJO¨STRAND, AND PONTUS STRIMLING
Abstract. We consider stable three-dimensional matchings of
three categories of agents, such as women, men and dogs. This
was suggested long ago by Knuth (1976), but very little seems to
have been published on this problem. Based on computer experi-
ments, we present a couple of conjectures as well as a few counter-
examples to other natural but discarded conjectures. In particular,
a circular 3D matching is one where women only care about the
man, men only care about the dog, and dogs only care about the
woman they are matched with. We conjecture that a stable out-
come always exists for any circular 3D matching market, and we
prove it for markets with at most four agents of each category.
1. Introduction
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem in matching the-
ory: Given a set of men and a set of women, find a matching that is
stable. A matching is stable if there is no blocking pair, that is, a man
and a woman who would prefer each other to their current partners in
the matching. Gale and Shapley (1962) introduced this problem and
proved that a stable matching must exist by describing an algorithm
that produces such a matching.
The theory of stable matchings has become an important subfield
within game theory, as documented by the book of Roth and Sotomayor
(1990). Game theorists are interested in the applications of matching
theory in real markets. However, the theory of stable matchings also
appeal to combinatorialists and computer scientists. Indeed, the first
book on the subject was written by combinatorial computer scientist
extraordinaire Donald E. Knuth (Knuth, 1976). These books discuss
not only the two-sided matching problem, but also the one-sided so
called roommate problem where any two agents can form a pair. For
the roommate problem, it is easy to find counter-examples to stability.
Date: October 31, 2004.
1991 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary: 91A06; Secondary: 91B68.
Key words and phrases. stable matching, 3GSM.
1
2 KIMMO ERIKSSON, JONAS SJO¨STRAND, AND PONTUS STRIMLING
Knuth (1976) lists a dozen suggested further directions for research
on stable matchings, one of which is to investigate three-dimensional
stable matching, say of women, men and dogs. A 3D matching is a
partition of the agents into triples consisting of one agent of each type.
A 3D matching is stable if no blocking triple exists, that is, a triple
(a, b, c) which each of its members would prefer to their current triples
in the matching. Of course, this calls for a definition of how agents
rank triples based on their preferences on other individuals. Many
possibilities exist.
The only paper we have found on three-dimensional stable matching
problems is a complexity investigation by Ng and Hirschberg (1991).
They showed that some instances of what they dub the three-gender
stable marriage problem (3GSM) do not have any strongly stable out-
comes, and proved that the decision problem is NP-complete. (Strong
stability is defined in the next section.) As an open problem, Ng and
Hirschberg mention the circular 3GSM where, say, women rank triples
based only on the man in the triple, and similarly men care only about
dogs, and dogs care only about women. The origin of this problem is
attributed to Knuth.
In this paper, we will report the results of our investigation of the
existence of stable outcomes of 3GSM in the circular version as well
as in a few other versions. Our main conjecture is that circular 3GSM
always allows a stable outcome. We prove this for all instances with
at most four agents of each gender, and we describe the evidence from
computer experimentation that led us to this conjecture.
2. Problem definition
Let N be the maximal number of agents of each of the three genders.
Thus, N = 3 means that we have at most nine agents (three women,
three men, three dogs). Without loss of generality we can assume that
we have the maximal number of agents of each gender, for otherwise
we can just fill the ranks with dummy agents who everybody likes less
than any real agent.
We will assume that every agent ranks all possible triples based on
her ranking of the individuals of the other genders. For example, every
woman will have a preference list of length 2N on the set of all men and
dogs. If a prefers b1 to c1 to b2, we write this as b1 >a c1 >a b2. Agents
together with their preferences constitute a 3G matching market.
We will see several different rules for generating preferences on triples
from preferences on individuals. If a prefers triple T1 to T2 we write
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T1 >a T2. If preferences are not strict, we use ≥a instead (weak prefer-
ence).
A 3G matching is a partition of the agents into N triples consisting
of a woman, a man and a dog. Given agents’ preferences on triples,
a 3G matching has a blocking triple T if all members of T strictly
prefer T to their current triples in the matching. A 3G matching is
stable if it has no blocking triples. A triple T is weakly blocking if
some member strictly prefers T to her current matching and the other
members weakly prefer T . A 3G matching is strongly stable if it has
no weakly blocking pair.
The problem is: Given a triple preference rule, does a stable 3G
matching exist for every matching market of size N? We have been
interested in the following rules for preferences on triples. Let T =
(a, b, c) and T ′ = (a, b′, c′).
• Circular : T >a T
′ if and only if b >a b
′. Similarly, men care
only about dogs, and dogs care only about women.
• Weakest link : T >a T
′ if mina(b, c) >a mina(b
′, c′). In general,
agents rank triples according to the weakest link of the triple,
that is, according to their least preferred partner.
• Strongest link : T >a T
′ if maxa(b, c) >a maxa(b
′, c′). In general,
agents rank triples according according to their most preferred
partner.
Note that the circular rule is a special case both of the weakest link rule
and the strongest link rule, depending on whether we let the gender
cared about in the circular rule be consistently low-ranked or high-
ranked in relation to the other gender.
3. Investigating stability by computer
For size N , the number of different matching markets is (2N)!3N , since
each agent ranks all 2N agents of other genders. Even if isomorphic
copies were deleted, the number of markets is large already for N = 3
and daunting for N > 3.
In order to investigate stability, we wrote a program (in Python)
which starts by generating a random market of a given size N ≤ 5. For
this market each of the N !2 possible matchings are checked for stabil-
ity (according to a given triple preference rule). The number of stable
matchings is recorded. Then a local search for markets with fewer
stable matchings is carried out as follows: Each of the 3N agents, in
turn, changes its preference list to every possible alternative permu-
tation. For each of these markets the number of stable matchings is
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computed, and whenever a new minimum is found, search proceeds
from this market.
If a market with zero stable matchings is found, we have a counter-
example to the existence of stable matchings for the given preferences
rule.
If no market with zero stable matchings is found, we have an indi-
cation that there is none. More specifically we obtain an indication of
the minimum number of stable matchings.
We started searching with N = 3, in which case we never found any
markets without stable matchings for any of the three preference rules.
This came as a surprise to us, and so we continued with N = 4.
4. Counter-examples to stability
With N = 4, our computer search found a counter-example to stability
under the weakest link rule. In order to present the preferences in a
convenient way, we write lists of ranking numbers from 1 to 8. Lower
rank means more preferred.
a1 : [[2, 8, 3, 7], [5, 1, 4, 6]]
a2 : [[7, 4, 2, 1], [3, 8, 5, 6]]
a3 : [[8, 4, 6, 3], [5, 2, 1, 7]]
a4 : [[1, 2, 8, 6], [7, 5, 3, 4]]
b1 : [[6, 5, 7, 2], [8, 3, 1, 4]]
b2 : [[7, 1, 4, 6], [5, 3, 8, 2]]
b3 : [[4, 3, 1, 2], [7, 6, 5, 8]]
b4 : [[8, 7, 5, 4], [6, 2, 1, 3]]
c1 : [[8, 3, 2, 7], [5, 4, 6, 1]]
c2 : [[5, 1, 6, 4], [8, 7, 2, 3]]
c3 : [[8, 1, 3, 2], [5, 6, 4, 7]]
c4 : [[8, 7, 5, 3], [1, 6, 2, 4]]
For women, the lists give the ranking of [[b1, b2, b3, b4], [c1, c2, c3, c4]].
For men, the lists denote the ranking of [[a1, a2, a3, a4], [c1, c2, c3, c4]].
For dogs, it is the ranking of [[a1, a2, a3, a4], [b1, b2, b3, b4]].
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Furthermore, we found a counter-example to strong stability under
the circular rule:
a1 : [1, 2, 4, 3]
a2 : [2, 1, 3, 4]
a3 : [2, 4, 3, 1]
a4 : [1, 3, 4, 2]
b1 : [3, 1, 2, 4]
b2 : [4, 1, 2, 3]
b3 : [3, 2, 4, 1]
b4 : [2, 4, 3, 1]
c1 : [2, 3, 4, 1]
c2 : [1, 4, 2, 3]
c3 : [2, 3, 4, 1]
c4 : [3, 1, 2, 4]
5. Conjectures
In the light of the counter-examples of the previous section, it is in-
triguing that days of computer time for N = 4 and N = 5 have not
resulted in any counter-examples to the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1. Under the strongest link rule, every 3G matching mar-
ket has a stable matching.
In fact, since the lowest number of stable matchings found by the com-
puter is two for both cases N = 4 and N = 5 (examples of such
markets available from the authors), we propose the following stronger
conjecture.
Conjecture 2. Under the strongest link rule, every 3G matching mar-
ket has at least two stable matchings.
For the circular rule, which is a special case of the strongest link rule,
the computer always find many stable matchings so we guess that the
minimal number of stable matchings increase with N . We do not have
enough evidence to produce a firmer guess, so our main conjecture is
simply:
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Conjecture 3. Under the circular rule, every 3G matching market has
a stable matching.
The circular case conjecture would seem to be amenable to an algo-
rithmic approach similar to the deferred acceptance procedure of Gale
and Shapley (1962) for two-sided marriages. In other words, it is not
difficult to come up with ideas of algorithms like the following:
“Let all women propose to the men they prefer most. Let every man
tentatively accept the woman who is most preferred by the dog the man
prefers most. Continue until all women propose to different men.”
However, all such ideas seem to run into problems and we have re-
signed ourselves to nonconstructive approaches: In the next section we
will describe how one might try to apply Scarf’s theorem (Scarf, 1971)
on balanced games, and why this fails. Finally we will carry out a
case-by-case analysis, which is doable for N ≤ 4 but then seems to get
out of hand.
6. Circular 3GSM is not a balanced game
If you want to show that a game has a nonempty core (which in our
case is equivalent to the existence of a stable matching), one approach
is to show that it is balanced in the sense of Scarf [6].
Theorem 4 (Scarf, 1967). A balanced n-person game always has a
nonempty core.
Quinzii [4] showed (in a more general setting) that the usual two-
dimensional matching game is balanced. However, in this section we
will see that our three-dimensional matching game is not.
For the general definition of a balanced game we refer to [6]. Here, we
will merely examine what it would mean for our game to be balanced.
Definition 5. A collection C of triples is balanced if there is possible
to find nonnegative real weights δT , for each triple T in C, such that,
for each person x, ∑
x∈T∈C
δT = 1.
A utility vector is a list where every person has written down her utility
goal, that is, how happy she hopes to become. A utility vector is
realizable if there is a matching such that every person reach her utility
goal. A utility vector is realizable for a triple if all people in the triple
would reach their utility goal if the triple were formed.
Definition 6. Our game is balanced if, for every balanced collection C
of triples, a utility vector is realizable if it is realizable for every triple
in C.
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a1
b1 c1
a2
b2 c2
a3
c3 b3
Figure 1. An example showing that our game is not balanced.
Now, we present a counterexample of size 3 + 3 + 3. Let C be the
collection of triples corresponding to the shaded triangles in figure 1.
This collection is balanced, since every person belongs to exactly two
triples (let all δT = 1/2). Choose the preferences so that the edges
in the figure correspond to rank 1 or 2. For example, a1 will rank b1
and b3 as number 1 and 2 (in any order) and b2 as number 3. Now
consider the utility vector where every person hopes to get at least her
second-best choice. This is obviously realizable for every triple in C, so
if the game were balanced, the utility vector would be realizable. Since
every instance of “x ranks y as number 1 or 2” has a corresponding
edge in the figure, a realization of the utility vector is equivalent to a
disjoint family of triangles (not necessarily shaded) in the figure which
covers all people. But there is no such family: To cover a2, either of
the triangles a2b1c1 and a2b2c2 must belong to the family. But none
of the three triangles containing a1 is disjoint with a2b1c1, and none of
the three triangles containing a3 is disjoint with a2b2c2.
7. Proof of stability for circular 3GSM with N ≤ 4
7.1. Notation. Say that a person is i-content if she has got the person
she ranks as number i.
If x’s favorite y’s favorite z ranks x as number i, we say that xyz is
a 11i-triple. The proposition “there is no 11i-triple for i < j” is called
the 11j-condition.
We will often use a dot diagram to describe partial information of
the preferences. Here is an example:
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s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s❍❍❍❍
3
a3
a2
a1
b3
b2
b1
c3
c2
c1
a3
a2
a1
A solid line means “rank 1”, a dashed line means “rank 2” and an
i-labeled line means “rank i”. So from the diagram above we get the
information that a1’s second-best choice is b2, but her favorite is b1
whose favorite is c1 who ranks a2 as number 3. To make the following
pages more readable, we will omit the dot labels, always implicitly
referring to the labeling above (in the 4-case, of course, there will be
an additional row a4b4c4a4 at the bottom).
7.2. The 3-case.
Theorem 7. In the 3-case there is always a stable matching. Further-
more, for any person x, there is a stable matching such that either x is
1-content, or x’s favorite is 1-content and x is 2-content.
Proof. We can assume that x = a1 whose favorite is b1 whose favorite
is c1.
Suppose there is a 111-triple abc. Then pick that triple to the match-
ing. Since a, b and c all are 1-content we can choose the other two
triples however we like — the resulting matching will be stable any-
way. If b1 = b he is 1-content and we choose the remaining two triples
so that a1 gets her first or second choice. If b1 6= b then a1 6= a and we
let the first triple be a1b1C where C is b1’s first or second choice, and
the second triple be the three remaining people.
In the following we assume there is no 111-triple, that is, we assume
the 112-condition. Say, without loss of generality, that c1’s favorite is
a2.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s❍❍❍❍
By the 112-condition, a2’s favorite is not b1, so we can assume that it
is b2. Now, b2’s favorite is not c1, so we can assume that it is c2.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s❍❍❍❍
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Now the matching a1b1c1, a2b2c2, a3b3c3 is stable: a1, a2, b1 and b2 are 1-
content, so a blocking triple must contain both a3 and b3 which already
are together. 
7.3. The 4-case.
Theorem 8. In the 4-case there is always a stable matching.
The proof is a technical case study who will last for the rest of this
section.
We have the following cases:
The 111-case: There is a 111-triple.
The 112-case: There is no 111-triple, but there is a 112-triple.
The 113-case: There is no 111- or 112-triple, but there is a 113-
triple.
The 114-case: There is no 111-, 112- or 113-triple.
The 111-case is trivial: remove the 111-triple and find a stable 3-
matching of the remainder; then the 111-triple together with the 3-
matching is a stable 4-matching since the people in the 111-triple are
1-content.
The 114-case is also simple: If there is a person x who is the favorite
of at least two people, then x’s favorite must rank some of these people
as number 1, 2 or 3, and we get a 111-, 112-, or 113-triple. Thus, in
the 114-case we know that no two people have the same favorite. We
just let all ai be 1-content and we get a stable matching.
7.3.1. The 112-case. We have the following situation.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s❍❍❍❍
By the 112-condition, a2’s favorite is not b1, so we can assume it is b2.
Now b2’s favorite is not c1, so we can assume it is c2.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s❍❍❍❍
We remove the triple a1b1c1 for a while. By theorem 7 there is a stable
3-matching of the remaining people such that either a2 is 1-content, or
b2 is 1-content and a2 is 2-content. This 3-matching forms a 4-matching
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together with the triple a1b1c1. We will show that this 4-matching is
stable.
Suppose there is a blocking triple. It has to contain someone among
a1, b1 and c1. Since a1 and b1 are 1-content they do not belong to the
blocking triple, so c1 does. The only person c1 wants to switch to is a2,
so a2 belongs to the blocking triple. Then a2 cannot have her favorite
b2, so, by construction of the 3-matching, a2 has her favorite among b3
and b4, and b2 has c2. So a2 wants to switch only to b2 or possibly b1,
both of which are 1-content.
7.3.2. The 113-case. If some person x is the favorite of at least three
people, then x’s favorite must rank some of these people as number 1
or 2, and we get a 111- or a 112-triple. Therefore, we can split the
113-case into two subcases:
Subcase 1: Every person is the favorite of either zero or two
people.
Subcase 2: There is a person who is the favorite of exactly one
person, but every person is the favorite of at most two people.
Subcase 1. Here we suppose that every person is the favorite of either
zero or two people. Then we have the following situation.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
❍❍❍❍
✟✟
✟✟
By the 113-condition we know that c1 ranks a1 and a2 as number 3 and
4, so a3 and a4 must be number 1 and 2.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
❍❍❍❍
✟✟
✟✟ ❅
❅
❅
❅
We see that b4’s favorite is not c1, so we can assume it is c4. Using the
113-condition again, we obtain the following.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
❍❍❍❍
✟✟
✟✟ ❅
❅
❅
❅
 
 
 
 
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Now we use that every favorite person is the favorite of exactly two
people.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
❍❍❍❍
✟✟
✟✟ ❅
❅
❅
❅
 
 
 
 
✟✟
✟✟
❍❍❍❍
a2’s second-best choice cannot be b2 or b3 since that would violate the
113-condition, so it must be b2. By applying the same reasoning to a3,
b1 and b4, we obtain the following diagram.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
❍❍❍❍
✟✟
✟✟ ❅
❅
❅
❅
 
 
 
 
✟✟
✟✟
❍❍❍❍
Now the matching a1b1c3, a2b2c1, a3b3c4, a4b4c2 is stable: a1 and a4 are
1-content, so a blocking triple must contain a2 or a3, say a2. But a2
wants to switch only to b1 who wants to switch only to c1 who already
has got a2. The same reasoning works for a3.
Subcase 2. Here we suppose that there is a person, say b3, who is the
favorite of exactly one person, but every person is the favorite of at
most two people.
If every bi is the favorite of exactly one person, then it is trivial to
find a stable matching: Just let all ai be 1-content. So we assume there
is a bi, say b1, who is the favorite of exactly two people. Then we have
the following situation:
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
✟✟
✟✟
By the 113-condition, b1’s favorite must rank a1 and a2 as 3 and 4.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
✟✟
✟✟ ❍❍❍❍
3
4
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Now, b3 or b4 cannot have c1 as a favorite, since c1 ranks a3 and a4 as 1
and 2, and that would violate the 113-condition. Thus we can assume
that b3’s favorite is, say, c3.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
✟✟
✟✟ ❍❍❍❍
3
4
Suppose b4 does not have c3 as a favorite. Then we can assume that
b4’s favorite is c4 (remember that we know it is not c1). But then
a1b1c1, a2b2c2, a3b3c3, a4b4c4 is a stable matching since all ai and bi are
1-content, except a2 and b2 which are already together. Thus we can
assume that b4’s favorite is c3.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
✟✟
✟✟ ❍❍❍❍
✟✟
✟✟
3
4
Again, form the matching a1b1c1, a2b2c2, a3b3c3, a4b4c4. What are the
possible blocking triples? We observe that a2 is the only ai which is
not 1-content, so a blocking triple must contain a2. Since b1 and b3 are
1-content and a2 already has got b2, it follows that b4 belongs to the
blocking triple. We also see that c1 cannot belong to the blocking triple,
since c1 already has a2 which it prefers to a1. Thus, the only possible
blocking triple is a2b4c3. In that case, a2 must prefer b4 to b2. In the
same manner (using the matching a1b1c1, a2b2c2, a3b3c4, a4b4c3 instead)
we deduce that a2 prefers b3 to b2. This means that a2’s second-best
choice is either b3 or b4. For symmetry reasons we can assume it is b3.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
✟✟
✟✟ ❍❍❍❍
✟✟
✟✟
3
4
By the 113-condition we know that c3’s favorite cannot be a2, a3 or a4,
so it must be a1.
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s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
✟✟
✟✟ ❍❍❍❍
✟✟
✟✟
 
 
 
 
3
4
Using the 113-condition again, we see that a1’s second-best choice can-
not be b3 or b4, so it must be b2.
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
✟✟
✟✟ ❍❍❍❍
✟✟
✟✟
3
4
Now, the matching a1b2c2, a2b1c1, a3b3c3, a4b4c4 is stable: The only ai
who is not 1-content is a1. She wants to switch only to b1 who is
1-content.
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